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Aviation Law: A Survey of Recent
Trends and Developments
by Jonathan R. Friedman*
and Joshua S. Wood*"
This aviation law Article focuses on selected developments during a
two-year survey period from June 1, 2007 to May 31, 2009. The first
part of this Article discusses federal preemption of, and immunity from,
state law tort claims. The second part examines recent aviation
decisions involving jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law. The third part
discusses discovery and evidence issues unique to aviation law. The
fourth part reviews recent product liability decisions. The fifth and final
part reviews important opinions analyzing aviation insurance.
I.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND IMMUNITY

A. The FederalAviation Act of 1958 and the Airline DeregulationAct
of 1978
In Dianav. NetJets Services,' a Connecticut superior court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss a personal injury negligence claim
asserted by an aviation school student who was allegedly struck by the
wing of a taxiing aircraft while walking on an airport median.2 The
* Partner in the firm of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, Atlanta,
Georgia. George Washington University (B.A., 1992); Georgetown University Law Center
(J.D., cum laude, 1998). Member, The Georgetown Law Journal (1995-1997); Associate
Editor (1996-1997). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The Author has previously contributed
to the Mercer Law Review in the field of trial practice and procedure. See Bruce P. Brown,
Jonathan R. Friedman, Michael R. Boorman & Benjamin J. Vinson, Trial Practice and
Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2006).
** University of Georgia (B.A., 2006); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2010).
After graduating from the University of Georgia School of Law in 2010, Joshua will join
the Atlanta office of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, as an associate.
1. No. CV075011701S, 2007 WL 4822585 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2007).
2. Id. at *6-7.
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defendant argued that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Aviation Act) 3
or the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)4 preempted the negligence claim and that the doctrine of implied field preemption applied
because the United States Congress had decided that a single, uniform
system of regulation was necessary to promote air safety. The plaintiff
argued that the claims were not preempted because there is no express
preemption of negligence claims.'
The court ultimately adopted the preemption analysis of two other
recent decisions:6 Aldana v. Air East Airways, Inc.7 and Abdullah v.
American Airlines, Inc.' The court explained that federal regulations
impliedly preempted the field of aviation safety, so the standard of care
is preempted even though the state remedy of a negligence claim is not.9
Whether the aircraft had been driven in a "careless or reckless" manner,
as prohibited by 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a),10 was the appropriate standard
of care." Although the complaint did not cite to a federal standard, the
court denied the motion to dismiss. 2 The court followed United States
Supreme Court precedent, 3 holding that Congress did not intend to
preempt all tort actions. 4 The savings clause of the Aviation Act 5
expressly
preserves state law remedies, including claims for personal
16
injury.

In Landis v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,'7 a magistrate judge in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania considered
both a motion to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings
filed by the defendants. 8 The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries
from a nose gear collapse during pushback from the terminal. The

3. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).

4. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Diana, 2007 WL 4822585, at *2.
Id. at *6.
477 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D. Conn. 2007).
181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
Diane, 2007 WL 4822585, at *6.
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2009).
Diana, 2007 WL 4822585, at *4 & n.10.
See id. at *7.

13.

See id. at *2-3 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 231 n.7

(1995);
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 390 (1992)).
Id. at *6.
49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (2006).
Diana, 2007 WL 4822585, at *2 & n.4, *6.
No. 07-CV-1216, 2008 WL 728369 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008).
Id. at *1.
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plaintiff asserted that the defendant airline did not take necessary steps
to prevent the accident, even after a crew member warned that the
landing gear wheel was not oriented with the plane's nose during
preflight inspection. 9 The defendants successfully argued that the
Aviation Act preempted the standard of care imposed by Pennsylvania
common law and that the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants
violated a particular federal standard of care.2' Even though the
complaint referred to the Aviation Act and generally alleged facts
demonstrating "careless and reckless" operation, the plaintiff failed to
identify the specific regulation violated.2 Accordingly, the court held
that in the absence of references in the pleadings to specific regulations,
a complaint alleging "careless and reckless" operation fails to state a
claim for relief.22
In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.,23 the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota denied an aircraft manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment that claimed the doctrines of "complete
preemption" and "conflict preemption" applied.'
The manufacturer
alleged that the Aviation Act completely preempted the field of aviation
safety and that conflict preemption barred the plaintiff's claims because
it would be impossible "to comply both with FAA [Aviation Act]
standards and state negligence standards."' For complete preemption
to apply, the court explained, the federal statute must provide a
remedial provision and clearly indicate that the provision is the
exclusive remedy for the alleged harm. 26 The court then noted that the
Aviation Act does not provide an express federal remedy for a violation
of the standard of care and that Congress had expressed no federal
intent for field preemption.2 7 Instead, "[the FAA] regulations were
intended to prevent accidents and not to 'provide a remedial mechanism
for individuals injured by a violation of aviation safety standards,' and
. . . 'state tort remedies remain for violation of the federally established
standards of care.'" 28 In addition, the court explained that the savings

19. Id.

20. Id. at *2-3.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at *3.
Id.
No. 06-CV-2661, 2008 WL 398814 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2008).
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2.
See id. at *3.

27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 05-2137, 05-2138, 2006 WL
399419, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2006)).
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clause evidences congressional intent against conflict preemption.2 9
Thus, federal law did not preempt plaintiff's state law claims arising out
of the crash.3 °
In Wong v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, 31 an injured pilot brought a
state law product liability suit against an airplane parts manufacturer.
The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that
the Aviation Act impliedly preempted the action. 2 The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut disagreed, holding that
state law and federal regulations had long coincided in this field3 3 and
that in 1990 Congress rejected the creation of national products liability
standards for the general aviation industry.34 The court relied on
decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits that rejected implied field preemption in state
products liability cases based on Congress's express preemption of
routes, services, and rates in the Aviation Act.38
B.

General Aviation RevitalizationAct

The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA)3 6 provides
immunity to aircraft manufacturers for accidents involving aircraft more
than eighteen years old.37 In Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.,38 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied GARA to
preclude claims brought in the United States by family members of
Macedonian residents who died in a 2004 crash in Bosnia.39 The
aircraft was manufactured and delivered in 1980, so the defendant
invoked GARA's eighteen-year statute of repose as an affirmative
defense. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and the district
court entered judgment for the defendant on claims alleging product
liability defects and lack of crashworthiness under Macedonian law.40
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.4 ' The court rejected the

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. No. 05-CV-1604, 2008 WL 160212 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2008).
32.
33.
34.

Id. at *1.
Id. (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1976)).
Id. at *2 (citing S. REP. No. 101-303 (1990)).

35. Id. (citing Pub. Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1993)).

36.

Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).

37.
38.
39.

Id. (defining a limitations period of eighteen years in section 3).
522 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 950.

40. Id. at 950-51.
41.

Id. at 955.
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plaintiffs' arguments that the presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal law applied to GARA.42 The court held that
GARA only regulates the ability of a party to sue in an American court,
but it does not regulate conduct that occurs outside the United States.4 3
The court noted that GARA "acts not just as an affirmative defense, but
instead 'creates an explicit statutory right not to stand trial.'""
In Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC,45 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that, although GARA
might apply, it did not support a stay of discovery." The plaintiffs
sued various companies involved in the manufacture, maintenance, and
repair of an aircraf 47 that was more than eighteen years old at the
time of the crash.' The defendants moved to stay discovery pending
resolution of their summary judgment motion on the GARA issue, or in
the alternative, to limit discovery to GARA-related issues. The plaintiffs
argued that it was impossible without further discovery to ascertain the
49
age of each replacement part, regardless of the original aircraft's age.
The court held that there was no basis to support the claim that the
defendants "should not have to submit to discovery if, under GARA, they
cannot be held liable for plaintiffs' claims." ° Instead, the court
explained that "GARA merely sets forth a defense to liability in cases
where the relevant airplane parts are more than eighteen years old."5'
The court concluded that it would be impossible to narrow discovery to
GARA issues.52 "There [was] not merely one 'GARA issue' to resolve in
this case, but rather a separate GARA issue for every part of the plane
that [was] added since the plane was new."53 Therefore, summary
judgment was not appropriate because discovery was needed to
determine facts about replacement parts less than eighteen years old.'

42.
43.
44.
1107,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 953.
Id.
Id. at 951 (quoting Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d
1110 (9th Cir. 2002)).
No. 4:07-CV-1695, 2008 WL 2570825 (E.D. Mo. June 26, 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2-3.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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The Federal Tort Claims Act
Generally, actions for damages against the government raise the
question of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)55
was passed in 194656 and waives, with certain exceptions, federal
government immunity from tort liability for the acts of its officers,
employees, and representatives."'
In United States Aviation Underwriters Inc. v. United States,58 the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted
the Government summary judgment in an action alleging that the
United States was negligent for failing to monitor turbulence advisories
issued by meteorologists and failing to warn a flight crew of the possible
turbulence.5 9 The court explained that "forecasting turbulence is a
discretionary function, and the FTCA exempts the Government from
liability for discretionary acts."6° The court noted, however, that if the
Government had forecasted turbulence and issued warnings, then it had
no discretion to fail to provide that information to the crew."1 The
plaintiff asserted that the exception did not apply because there was an
actual occurrence of clear air turbulence sufficient to warrant the
issuance of warnings, thus depriving the forecasters of discretion.62
The court disagreed, however, and unequivocally held that weather
diagnostics and forecasting are within the types of discretionary
activities shielded under the exception.' 3 Even if the Government was
grossly negligent in failing to issue an advisory, the Government could
not be held liable.'
Because the Government never decided that
significant air turbulence was occurring, the Government was not
required to warn flight crews.'
In Supinski v. United States,' the representative of a deceased
parent's estate brought an FTCA suit alleging that the flight instructor
and designated pilot examiner who certified the plane's pilot were
government employees and were negligent in: (1) issuing the airplane

55.
56.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680.
567 F. Supp. 2d 1407 (M.D. Ga. 2008).
Id. at 1409-10.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1410.
Id.
Id.
No. 4:07-CV-963, 2008 WL 199546 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2008).
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pilot's certificate, (2) certifying the pilot's flight school, and (3) hiring,
training, and supervising the examiner and pilot. As such, the complaint
contended that the Government was responsible for the injuries." The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' The
court considered both what constitutes a government employee for
purposes of the FTCA and whether the discretionary function exception
applied to the case. 9
The court found that neither the trainer nor the examiner were federal
employees because the Government did not exercise sufficient control
over their performance.70 The trainer was employed by a private flight
school that set training schedules and fees, assigned students, and
supervised performance. The pilot examiner was self-employed and did
not have a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contract.7 1 Although
both the trainer and examiner applied standards prescribed by federal
regulations in assessing the pilot's fitness, this did not render them
government employees. 2
The discretionary function exception precluded the claim that the
Government was negligent in regulating the flight school.73 The
plaintiff argued that the FANs negligence in certifying the flight school
and failing to decertify the school rendered the Government liable.74
The court rejected this argument, noting that "[all of the applicable
regulations speak in the permissive and they do not set forth a fixed...
standard which the FAA must apply in certifying a flight school."75
Further, the FTCA did not waive the Government's sovereign immunity
for claims concerning hiring, training, and supervision because the
decisions fell under the exception.76
In In re Air Crashat Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 (Lexington
ii/),77 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky dismissed the plaintiff's FTCA claims because the FTCA did
not waive the Government's sovereign immunity when state law did not

67. Id. at *1.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See id. at *3-6.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.

77. No. 5:06-CV-316, 2008 WL 2397708 (E.D. Ky. June 11, 2008).
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provide for private liability under similar circumstances."8
The
plaintiff's claims arose when a Comair flight attempted to take off from
the wrong runway, hitting multiple non-frangible objects and killing all
forty-seven passengers and two of the three crew members.79 Before
addressing the discretionary function exception, the court decided it was
necessary to ascertain whether state law would attach a duty of care in
a purely private setting, which is the "first hurdle to establishing
jurisdiction under the FTCA."'
The plaintiff argued that, under
Kentucky's "Good Samaritan" law,"1 the United States had a duty to
use due care. 2 The court rejected the argument because the plaintiff
could not "show that the FAA undertook to render any 'services'" to the
plaintiff, and thus, no actions gave rise to a duty owed to the plaintiff."
As such, the plaintiff could not prove proximate cause, and the claims
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.' Additionally, the court noted
that claims regarding the air traffic controller's schedule might fall
within the discretionary function exception, but reserved the consideration of the exception for trial.'
In Farag v. United States," the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied the Government's motion for
summary judgment on FTCA claims.8 7 The plaintiffs were two friends
of Arab ethnicity on a domestic flight to New York. Two U.S. agents,
who were also on the flight, believed the plaintiffs were acting suspicious
because they spoke in a mixture of Arabic and English, looked at their
watches repeatedly as if "timing" events, and moved seats to sit by one
another. Upon arrival, officers in SWAT gear with shotguns and police
dogs were waiting for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were frisked,
handcuffed, jailed, interrogated, and released about four hours later."
After complying with the administrative prerequisites of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b), 9 the plaintiffs filed suit.9 ° The plaintiffs alleged that the

78. Id. at *8.
79. Defendant/rhird-Party Plaintiffs Third-Party Complaint at 2, In re Air Crash at
Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2006 WL 5100433 (E.D. Ky.
2006).
80. Lexington III, 2008 WL 2397708, at *2.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965), quoted in Ostendorf v. Clark
Equip. Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 530 (Ky. 2003).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Lexington III, 2008 WL 2397708, at *1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
587 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 443-48.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006).
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agents committed the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment.9 1
The court applied the substantive law of New York-the law of the
jurisdiction where the events occurred.'
In determining whether an
arrest was actually made, the court held that the officers' use of force
and restraint, along with the transportation, incarceration, and
interrogation of the plaintiffs, qualified this as an arrest. 3 Further,
the court explained that the Government lacked the necessary probable
cause to arrest the plaintiffs, and the agents could not merely rely on
Arab ethnicity to create probable cause. 4
In Cahill v. United States,9 5 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida determined that it had jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's FTCA claims. 6 The plaintiff alleged that the air traffic
controllers' negligent failure to provide required separation distance
between two planes exposed the second plane to the first plane's wake
turbulence, causing the second plane to crash. Separation standards
exist to avoid these types of accidents.98 The Government alleged that
the accident was caused by pilot error.99 The court found that the
controllers breached their duty by failing to maintain the required
separation of four nautical miles between the planes."° However, the
court determined that "the cause of [the] accident was not a wake
turbulence encounter."''
Therefore, the failure to maintain the
required separation "did not cause the accident, nor was it a substantial
factor in causing the accident." 2
II.
A.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CHOICE OF LAW

PersonalJurisdiction

In Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost,"3 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's denial of Vibratech's motion to dismiss for lack of

90.
91.

Farag,587 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
Id. at 451.

92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 469.
No. 8:05-CV-2379-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 1711519 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2008).
Id. at *8.
Id. at *1.
See id. at *2-3; see also FAA Order JO 7110.65S § 5-5-4(f) (Feb. 14, 2008).
Cahill, 2008 WL 1711519, at *1.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *11.
Id.
291 Ga. App. 133, 661 S.E.2d 185 (2008).
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personal jurisdiction and, in doing so, affirmed that subsection (1) of the
Georgia long arm statute"°4 reaches to the maximum extent of due
process."°5 The case arose from a 2004 crash in Tennessee of an
aircraft owned by the Georgia Cumberland Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, resulting in five deaths. Among the parties sued was
Vibratech, a defunct Delaware corporation whose principal place of
business was in New York. Vibratech manufactured a viscous damper
used in the plane and sold the part to manufacturer Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. (TCM),'O° which supplied engines across the country.10 7 Vibratech had shipped the part to TCM in Mobile, Alabama."~
Vibratech claimed that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction
because the company had no offices or agents in Georgia and never
marketed its products for use specifically in Georgia." ° The court of
appeals ruled, however, that jurisdiction was proper under subsection (1)
of Georgia's long arm statute, which provides for jurisdiction over a
defendant transacting any business within Georgia." ° The court
acknowledged it had not previously considered the application of
subsection (1) when "the manufacturer of an aviation component
ship[ped] to an intermediary like TCM, who install[ed] the part into an
aviation engine and then ship[ped] the engine into Georgia.""' The
court noted that it would consider Vibratech's "intangible contacts" when
determining personal jurisdiction under subsection (1).12 Jurisdiction

exists if: "'(1) the nonresident defendant has purposefully done some act
or consummated some transaction in this state, (2) ... the cause of

action arises from or is connected with such act or transaction, and (3)
... the

exercise of jurisdiction ...
and substantial justice.'"113

does not offend traditional fairness

This test was met because Vibratech sold the damper to an Alabama
manufacturer for resale in United States locations, including Geor-

104.

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) (2007).

105. Vibratech, 291 Ga. App. at 135, 140, 661 S.E.2d at 188, 191.
106. Id. at 134, 661 S.E.2d at 187.
107. See id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 190.
108. Id. at 134, 661 S.E.2d at 187.
109. Id. at 135, 661 S.E.2d at 188.
110. Id. at 139-40, 661 S.E.2d at 190-91; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) (providing for
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who "[transacts any business within this state").
111. Vibratech, 291 Ga. App. at 136, 661 S.E.2d at 189.
112. Id. at 137, 661 S.E.2d at 189.
113. Id. (quoting Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515,517-18, 631 S.E.2d
734, 737 (2006)).
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gia. 1" In fact, the manufacturer's website even identified the Georgia
maintenance facility that had installed the engine." 5 Vibratech should
have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court" in Georgia because
it placed the part in the stream of commerce knowing it would be
purchased by consumers throughout the United States, including in
Georgia." 6 The court held that fairness required that the plaintiffs be
able to seek redress in Georgia rather than New York or Delaware." 7
B. Removal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Ray v. American Airlines, Inc.,"8 a passenger claimed intentional
infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, negligence, and
breach of contract, alleging that she was subjected to deplorable
conditions while her plane was grounded for eleven hours." 9 After the
defendant airline removed the case to federal court, 120 the district
court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand because the claims were
properly removed.' 2 ' The court had diversity jurisdiction because the
complaint contained sufficient allegations to support a potential award
exceeding the $75,000 required for an individual case or the $5 million
in the aggregate required for a class action.'22 Although the complaint
did not specify an amount of damages sought, the court relied in part on
a settlement letter sent by the plaintiff.'23 Federal Rule of Evidence
408124 did not prohibit the use of the settlement letter
for the limited
12 5
purpose of establishing the amount in controversy.
In Goonewardena v. AMR Corp.,126 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York held that it lacked original jurisdiction-and it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction-over a suit
filed by a passenger alleging discrimination.' 27 The plaintiff passenger
alleged that after his flight was canceled, his request for overnight

114. Id. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 190-91.
115. Brief of Appellees at 7-8, Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, 291 Ga. App. 133, 661 S.E.2d
185 (2008) (No. A07A2078).
116. Vibratech, 291 Ga. App. at 139, 661 S.E.2d at 190-91.
117. Id. at 140, 661 S.E.2d at 191.
118. No. 08-5025, 2008 WL 3992644 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2008).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5-6.
124. FED. R. EvID. 408.
125. Ray, 2008 WL 3992644, at *4.
126. No. 08-CV-4141, 2008 WL 5049904 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2008).
127. Id. at *4.
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accommodation was denied, and he was removed from his flight the next
day on the erroneous assumption that he was ill. The defendants
removed from state court to federal court.128 The plaintiff amended his
complaint to withdraw his claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964129
and to limit the damages on his state law claims to less than $75,000.
He sought to have the case remanded to state court, claiming lack of
jurisdiction 3 °
The court held that remand was appropriate because the court lacked
jurisdiction.' 3 ' The court explained that "'[u]nder the completepreemption doctrine, certain federal statutes are construed to have such
extraordinary preemptive force that state-law claims coming with[in] the
scope of the federal statute are transformed, for jurisdictional purposes,
into federal claims-i.e., completely preempted.'"132 The court dismissed the defendants' argument that the suit arose under federal law
merely because ordinary preemption under the Aviation Act or ADA
might be raised as a defense.' 33 For complete preemption, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff's claims were "in actuality nothing
more than claims brought under the FAA [Aviation Act] and the ADA,
clothed as claims under" state law.134 Neither federal law provision
gave a private right of action, so the plaintiff could not bring claims
under the federal statutes.'3 5 Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction
over the state law claims. 136 The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because the plaintiff had withdrawn
his sole federal claim early in the litigation.'37
In Swanstrom v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.,"' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama remanded to
Alabama state court a wrongful death suit arising out of an aircraft
crash.139 The defendants had removed the case to federal court under
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 140 the federal officer removal statute. 41 The

128. Id. at "1.
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2006).
130. Goonewardena, 2008 WL 5049904, at *1.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id. at *2 (quoting Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005)).
133. Id. at *2-3.
134. Id. at *2.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 531 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Ala. 2008).
139. Id. at 1334.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006).
141. Swanstrom, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1331. Under the federal officer removal statute,
"[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that
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defendants claimed that the FAA had Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) employed by one of the defendants to represent the
agency in examining, testing, and certifying aircraft crashworthiness. The district court noted that neither of the DERs were named
as defendants, and the allegations did not identify a specific FAA
representative." Officer removal was not appropriate because there
was "no evidence or argument that they [were] designated in any
manner as a representative of the FAA."' The court held that mere
participation in a regulated industry is not enough," and "removal is
appropriate only where the FAA representative has been specifically
named and the allegations relate to conduct of the FAA representative
while acting in the capacity of an FAA representative."'
C.

Forum Non Conveniens
In In re Air CrashNear Peixoto de Azeveda, Brazil, on September 29,
2006, 4 1 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York dismissed a suit arising from a midair collision of an executive
jet and a Brazilian airliner under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.'" Under this doctrine, federal courts have discretion to dismiss
a properly filed action if it is more convenient for the litigation to
149
proceed in an alternative forum.

The defendants argued that New York was an inappropriate forum
and that the plaintiffs filed there only because of the generosity of juries
in the United States. 5 ° Further, the defendants contended that Brazil
was an adequate and available alternative15" ' and that most of the
evidence, documents, and witnesses were located in Brazil. 52 Moreover, all of the plaintiffs were Brazilian residents. 53

officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual
capacity for any act under color of such office" may remove an action from state to federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
142. Swanstrom, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
143. Id. at 1332.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1333.
147. 574 F. Supp. 2d 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
148. Id. at 275.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 279 n.2. The court "put little stock" in this argument. Id.
See id. at 282.
See id. at 287.
Id. at 275-76.
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Relying on precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, the district court applied a three-step analysis for forum
non conveniens. 4 Under this analysis, a court (1) determines the
degree of deference accorded to the plaintiff's forum choice, (2) determines whether the proposed alternative forum is available and adequate,
and (3) balances public and private interests implicated in the choice of
forum." As to step one, the court explained that a suit in a plaintiff's
home forum is due great deference because it is presumed convenient,
but it is "'much less reasonable to presume that the choice was made for
convenience'" when it is a foreign plaintiff suing in the United
States. 1' The court determined that the plaintiffs' forum choice was
only entitled to limited deference.'57 In doing so, the court rejected the
argument that the choice was entitled to the same deference that Article
XII of the Treaty with Brazil" 8 grants U.S. citizens and residents.'6 9
The court reasoned that the Treaty did not apply to the plaintiffs
because it only "requires that the signatories' courts be open to foreign
nationals who happen to be located within the territory of the other,"
and the plaintiffs were not located in, nor had they ever been to, the
United States.6
Because the plaintiffs' choice of forum was given a
lesser degree of deference, the action had to be dismissed "'if the chosen
forum [was] shown to be genuinely
inconvenient and the [alternate]
1
forum significantly preferable.' "'6
Next, the court held that Brazil was an adequate and available
forum.112 The plaintiffs' argument that their claims would be fragmented in Brazil was rejected because a lack of consolidation does not
render a forum inadequate." Further, Brazil was an adequate forum
because the potential delay by the Brazilian judicial system was
sufficiently minimal relative to delays in the United States. ' 6 Brazil
was also an available forum because the defendants expressly agreed to

154. See id. at 279-89.
155. Id. at 278 (citing Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001)).
156. Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iragorri,274 F.3d at 71).
157. Id. at 281.
158. Treaty with Brazil, U.S.-Braz., art. XII, Dec. 12, 1828, 8 Stat. 390, 392.
159. In re Air CrashNear Peixoto de Azevda, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 280-81 (citing Treaty
with Brazil, supra note 157, at 392).
160. Id. at 281.
161. Id. at 282 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 2006)).
162. Id. at 284-85.
163. Id. at 284.
164. Id.
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jurisdiction, and there would be personal jurisdiction over all of the
defendants in Brazil. 165
Finally, the court balanced the private and public interest factors,
finding that they favored dismissal.6 6 Private interest factors include:
"[1] the relative ease of access to sources of proof; [21 the availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; [31 the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; [4] [ilssues concerning
the enforceability of a judgment; and [5] all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive-or the
opposite." 67
Although many involved entities would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States, all of the defendants and other important
entities would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Brazil.1' Further,
it was possible that parties would be unable to compel testimony or
evidence in the United States,'6 9 unlike in Brazil, where the witnesses,
evidence, and the wreckage site would be readily available. 7 ' Therefore, private factors favored dismissal.' 7 '
The public interest factors include (1) administrative difficulties from
court congestion; (2) local interest in having the case decided at home;
(3) the interest in having a forum familiar with the governing law; (4)
avoidance of conffict of law issues or difficulties in applying foreign law;
172
and (5) burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
The court held that there was no significant congestion of either United
States or Brazilian courts, and although it would not be unfair to subject
U.S. citizens to jury duty in the case, the other factors favored venue in
Brazil. 173 Brazil's interest was obvious and outweighed the United
States' interest. 174 Therefore, the United States was a "genuinely
inconvenient" venue, and Brazil was "significantly preferable." 75
In Clerides v. Boeing Co., 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the forum non conveniens dismissal of a

165. Id. at 283.
166. Id. at 289.
167. Id. at 285 (alterations in original) (quoting Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d
287, 294 (2d Cir. 1996)).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
See id. at 286.
Id. at 287-88 (citing Murray, 81 F.3d at 293).
Id. at 288-89.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
534 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2008).
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wrongful death claim brought by representatives of a Cypriot passenger,
which resulted from a plane crash in Greece.177 The plaintiffs alleged
that the Cypriot airline, Helios Airways, failed to properly pressurize,
causing the crew and passengers to lose consciousness and asphyxiate.'78 On appeal, the parties conceded that both Greece and Cyprus
were adequate and available fora; therefore, the court's decision hinged
on its analysis of the private and public interest factors.' 7 9
First, addressing the private interest factors, the court held that the
ease of access to proof in Greece and Cyprus favored dismissal.18 ° The
court noted that evidence and witnesses related to the action against
Boeing were in the United States, but Boeing had agreed to make
witnesses and evidence available in Cyprus and Greece. 8 '
The remainder of the relevant proof [was] located primarily in Greece
and Cyprus ... includ[ing] the evidence and witnesses related to
Helios and the flight crew, the primary investigations of the crash and
the wreckage, the post-mortem examinations of the decedents, and
evidence and witnesses related to the families' pain and suffering.182
In addition, the compulsory process for obtaining unwilling witnesses
favored dismissal because witnesses related to Helios would not be
available in the United States, and the parties would need to use the
Hague Convention" to obtain their testimony, which was not practical.'8'
The public interest factors also favored dismissal. 8 5 The interests
of Greece and Cyprus in "regulating the use of allegedly defective
products within their borders" were equal to the United States' interest
in regulating the manufacture of products within its borders.'8 6
Further, none of the 115 decedents were U.S. citizens, only one was
possibly a U.S. resident, and 111 decedents were residents of Cyprus or
Greece.8 7 Finally, Greece and Cyprus demonstrated their interests in
the health and safety of their residents by conducting multiple investiga-

177.
178.
179.

Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 629.

180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
(Hague
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
Convention), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
Clerides, 534 F.3d at 629-30.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
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tions into the crash. 1" Therefore, the court's analysis of the public
and private interest factors was reasonable and not an abuse of
discretion.18 9
In Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co.,"9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a products liability
suit by citizens of the Netherlands against U.S. manufacturers regarding
the crash of a Singaporean-owned airplane in Taiwan.19' The trial
court dismissed the action, concluding that Singapore was an available
and alternative forum and that private and public interest factors
favored dismissal."9 Because Singapore courts had access to critical
evidence the district court could not control, dismissal was appropriate. 193 The appellate court considered the fact that evidence and many
important witnesses were located in Singapore."9 Further, the district
court properly considered the United States' interest as a whole, not just
California's interest, before concluding that Singapore's interest was
greater. 195

In In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation,'9
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that the
forum non conveniens doctrine would not operate to allow a dismissal in
favor of a Canadian forum even though the case concerned a Canadian
pilot who was killed in a plane crash in Canada.197 The pilot's family
sued Cessna Aircraft Corporation and Goodrich Corporation claiming
that faulty design and manufacturing of certain aircraft parts had
caused the crash.' 9 The court held, however, that the balance of
private and public interest factors did not dictate dismissal.' 99
As to the private interest factors, the court noted that most of the
liability evidence was in Kansas, where Cessna was incorporated and
where it designed, tested, and built the aircraft.2 ° Although some
evidence was in Canada, it was not in a central location.20 1 Therefore,

188. Id.
189. Id.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

263 F. App'x 555 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 557.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
546 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Kan. 2008).
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1194-96.
Id. at 1196.
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the ease of access to evidence "weigh[ed] strongly in favor of [the]
plaintiffs."2 °2 Further, the availability of compulsory process for
unwilling witnesses slightly favored Cessna, but "the record [did] not
reflect that a significant number of witnesses [would] be unwilling to
cooperate or that cost to obtain compliance [would] be substantial."2"
Turning to the public interest factors, the court explained that
although Canada had an interest in the litigation because the decedent
was a Canadian citizen, the United States had an interest in "regulating
the conduct of resident aircraft manufacturers even [when] a particular
aircraft accident occurs in a foreign country."2°4 Although Canadian
law likely would apply, Cessna had not proven that it would be difficult
for the court to apply Canadian law." s As a result, factors that
slightly favored Canada were "outweighed by the ease of access to
sources of proof as part of this consolidated proceeding and the interest
of the United States in regulating the conduct of a resident aircraft
manufacturer."2 6
D.

Choice of Law
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 (Lexington
1/),207 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky evaluated competing state damages laws in a suit brought by
the families of three passengers who died in a Comair runway crash. At
the time of the crash, one victim was a New York resident, one was a
Kentucky citizen, and one was a citizen of New Mexico.2 8 The court
rejected the plaintiffs'
claims that state law other than Kentucky law
2 °9
should apply.
The New York resident had originally filed suit in a New York federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction, so the court applied New York
choice of law rules to this plaintiff.21 The court performed an "interest
analysis" under standards established in Neumeier v. Kuehner2" and
its progeny.21 2 Under the second Neumeier rule, the law of the state
in which the accident occurred generally applies if one of the parties is

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
No. 5:06-CV-316, 2008 WL 631238 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2008).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *6-8.
Id. at *2.
286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
Lexington II, 2008 WL 631238, at *3.
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domiciled in the state.2 13 The plaintiff argued, however, that because
not all of the defendants were domiciled in Kentucky and because there
were substantial contacts with New York, the third Neumeier rule
applied, which would allow the situs of the tort to be displaced as the
governing law if it would "'advance the relevant substantive law
purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants."' 4 The court held
that the domicile of the Comair defendants in Kentucky mandated
application of the second rule, and Kentucky law applied.215 Further,
because all claims against Delta were related to Delta's relationship with
Comair, there was no basis for disregarding the Comair defendants'
domiciles.216
The court applied Kentucky choice of law rules in the cases of the
other two victims, who originally filed suit in Kentucky.217 Kentucky
choice of law applies when "'Kentucky has enough contacts to justify
applying Kentucky law' 21 8 even though they are "'not necessarily the
most significant contacts.'"219 There were sufficient contacts in this
case because the accident occurred in Kentucky, Comair was a citizen of
Kentucky, and the forum court sat in Kentucky.22 ° Even the New
Mexico resident, who owned a horse farm and breeding business in
Kentucky, had significant contacts such that the application of Kentucky
law was appropriate.2 2'
III. UNIQUE DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE ISSUES
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 (Lexington
/),222 a federal district court held that voluntary safety reports from
pilots and airline personnel (ASAP reports) were discoverable and not
privileged.223 In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27,
2006 (Lexington /V),224 the court also held that cockpit voice recorder

213. Id. at *5.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
1997)).
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at *4 (quoting Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458).
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *2 (quoting Adam v. J.B. Hunt Trans., Inc., 130 F.3d 219, 230-31 (6th Cir.
Id. (quoting Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972)).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
545 F. Supp. 2d 618 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
Id. at 619-20, 624.
No. 5:06-CV-316, 2008 WL 2782827 (E.D. Ky. July 8, 2008).

604

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

(CVR) audio tape recordings were admissible at trial.225 However, in
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 (Lexington
V),226 the court excluded the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) safety recommendations from evidence.22 7
First, the court found that ASAP reports were admissible and not
protected by any common law or self-critical analysis privileges.2 2
Second, the court rejected Comair's arguments that the CVR recordings
were irrelevant and highly prejudicial.229 Comair argued that (1) the
recordings, which contained crew shouts and exclamations, would "play
on the jury's sympathies and impair their ability to use reason," (2) there
was "no evidence that these sounds were recorded from anywhere but
the cockpit and, therefore, [were] not relevant," and (3) the jury could
"reference the CVR transcript without the prejudicial effect of [playing]
the recording.""3 The court held that "the tone of voice, pitch, and
inflection of the pilots statements [sic] are highly relevant to their state
of mind and to [the] [pilaintiffs' claims of negligence and gross negligence. These aspects of their statements are completely absent from a
printed page. " 2"1
Finally, under 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b), 232 the court held that the NTSB
safety recommendations were inadmissible.23 In doing so, the court
analyzed the relationship between § 1154(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 835.2,23
the NTSB's own regulations.2 35 Pursuant to its own regulation, the
NTSB does not oppose the use of factual reports in evidence, but it
opposes the use of reports containing NTSB conclusions and determinations.2 36 The court found that although Congress had not explicitly
granted the NTSB rule-making authority in this area, its determination
was "entitled to some deference and is persuasive."23 7 The court cited
prior decisions in which safety recommendations were identified as
conclusions and determinations of the NTSB, and also relied on an
opinion letter from NTSB general counsel outlining the agency's position

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at *3.
No. 5:06-CV-316, 2008 WL 2796875 (E.D. Ky. July 18, 2008).
Id. at *5.
Lexington 1, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24.
Lexington IV, 2008 WL 2782827, at *1-2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2006).
Lexington V, 2008 WL 2796875, at *5.
49 C.F.R. § 835.2 (2009).
Lexington V, 2008 WL 2796875, at *2-4.
See 49 C.F.R. § 835.2.
Lexington V, 2008 WL 2796875, at *4.
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that such recommendations were statutorily barred from admission."5
to keep the NTSB "'free of the
The court noted that it was important
239
entanglement of such suits.'"
IV.

PRODUCT LIABILITY DECISIONS

In Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.,

the United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota considered whether Cirrus could be
held liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate training to an
aircraft purchaser.2"
The court held that by voluntarily providing
"transition training," including autopilot training, a duty arose to
provide training to the aircraft purchaser.2' 2 For purposes of summary
judgment, the court assumed that the purchaser did not receive autopilot
training2 and held that the issue of liability would be decided based
upon the ordinary prudent designer and manufacturer standard.2'
[B]y manufacturing an aircraft with an autopilot mechanism and
including 'transition training' as part of the aircraft's purchase price,
Cirrus could have foreseen the injury as alleged in this case. The
connection between Cirrus' allegedly negligent training and the
Plaintiffs' claimed damage [was] not so remote that the [c]ourt [could]
conclude that public policy require[d] awarding summary judgment in
favor of Cirrus at this stage. 2'
Additionally, the court denied summary judgment on the manufacturer's
defense that it had contracted out training to an independent thirdparty.246 Finally, the court granted summary judgment to the manufacturers on the strict liability and warranty claims, noting that there
was no evidence submitted to support the claim that the aircraft was
unsafe or defective.247
In Dalrymple v. FairchildAircraft Inc. ,24 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to
the defendant, Fairchild Aircraft, Inc., 2" which acquired Swearingen

238. Id. at *2-4.
239. Id. at *5 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (2009)).
240. No. 06-2661, 2008 WL 398814 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2008).

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-6.

248. 575 F. Supp. 2d 790 (S.D. Tex. 2008).

249. Id. at 799.
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Aircraft Corporation, the company that designed and manufactured a
Merlin IV airplane that crashed off the coast of Spain, allegedly as a
result of electrical failure caused by a lightning strike. 5 ° The aircraft
was operated by Flightline, S.L. 1' The plaintiff sued under the Death
on the High Seas Act, 2 alleging a failure to warn of the vulnerability
of the plane's power systems if struck by lighting.M3 After a predecessor Swearingen/Flightline airplane was struck by lightning, lost power,
and crashed in Germany, the predecessor issued a service bulletin
recommending "removal of a particular battery diode in order [t]o
preclude de-energizing Battery Bus Relay if [the] diode shorts. "2 4
Fairchild had delivered a complete set of aircraft manuals to Flightline
approximately nine months before the accident, including the service
bulletin at issue."
Fairchild had no duty to warn of alleged deficiencies based on a
federal aviation regulation, which imposes a duty on Type Certificate
holders to inform the FAA of malfunctions or defects. 6 The court
explained that Fairchild held the Type Certificate, and the language
clearly states that the duty to report only applies to aircraft that
the
2 7
Type Certificate holder manufactured and not to the successor. 6
Further, the court dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claims brought
under the Death on the High Seas Act. 25" Even if Fairchild had a
post-sale duty to warn of potential product defects, it satisfied that duty
by providing the charter company a copy of the service bulletin and a set
of aircraft manuals that warned of a risk of a short circuit to the diode
in the event of a lightning strike. 250 Fairchild did not breach a duty
of reasonable care by failing to advise the charter company of unarticulated potential defects. 26° There was no evidence identifying defects
that rendered the airplane "vulnerable to electrical failure in the event
of a lightning strike, or any changes that could or should have been
made to alleviate that risk."2 ' There was no evidence that the
defendant was aware of vulnerabilities in the plane other than those

250.

Id. at 793.

251. Id.
252. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-08 (2006).
253. Dalrymple, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 793 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 796-97 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 (2009)).
Id. at 797.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
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addressed in the service bulletin.2 62 Last, the plaintiff could not
demonstrate the detrimental reliance element of a negligent undertaking
claim and, in the absence of such evidence, the claim failed.2" The
court concluded that providing the service bulletin actually made the
aircraft safer.2"
In In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation, 5
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas addressed the
defendant FlightSafety's motion for summary judgment relating to
claims arising from an aircraft accident.'
The plaintiffs filed wrongful death claims on behalf of family members, alleging that the school:
(1) negligently failed to properly instruct the pilots on how to avoid ice
accumulation, (2) fraudulently failed to disclose information about icing
conditions with the Cessna Caravan, and (3) breached express and
implied warranties to the family concerning the school's training and
267
safety instructions and the aircraft itself.
First, applying Texas law, the court denied FlightSafety's motion for
summary judgment on educational malpractice claims because a nearly
identical motion had been denied in state court before removal. 2' The
district court observed that it would be improper to second-guess the
reasoning of the state court's interpretation of state law and that the
state 9trial court judge's ruling was a reasonable application of Texas
26
law.

Second, the court denied FlightSafety's motion for summary judgment
based on federal preemption 270 because FlightSafety failed to establish
"(1) that plaintiffs' state law tort claims regarding its curriculum and
flight simulators stand as an obstacle to... execution of the full [FAA
regulation objectives] or (2) that it [was] impossible for FlightSafety to
comply with both federal and state law pertaining to its curriculum
and flight simulators ....

In particular, FlightSafety offer[ed] no

evidence that if it had proposed additional instruction or simulations
on icing conditions, the FAA would have rejected them."27'

262. Id.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 799.
546 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D. Kan. 2008).
See id. at 1155.
Id. at 1157.
See id. at 1157-59.
See id. at 1159.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1160-61 (internal citations omitted).
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Finally, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment
on the breach of implied warranty claims because providing flight
training materials is not a tangible good or property that can be the
subject of such claims.272 However, the court denied summary judgment on the express warranty claims because there is no federal
preemption of such claims. 273
V. INSURANCE POLICY COVERAGE

In Sugar Financial Group, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of the State of
Pennsylvania,74 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington held that exclusions in an aviation insurance
policy were not ambiguous, and the pilot's failure to meet the pilot
endorsement requirements precluded coverage for aircraft damage.275
The endorsement required that the pilot hold a "current and valid FAA
Private, Commercial, or ATP pilot certificate rating and endorsements
applicable to [the] aircraft, including an instrument rating" and have at
least "1000 total logged hours as pilot-in command of aircraft, of which
includes. . . 50 hours same make and model as [the] aircraft [and] 500
hours multi-engine powered fixed wing aircraft."2 76 The pilot did not
have an instrument rating and had only approximately 400 hours of
total logged time.2 77 The policy also included a number of exclusions:
This insurance does not apply:
1. under any coverage
c) when the aircraft is in flight:
i) with your knowledge and consent for either an unlawful purpose or
for other than the Approved Use;
ii) when a special permit or waiver is required by the FAA;
iii) if piloted by anyone other than:
(1) a pilot specified in [the pilot endorsement];
(2) a pilot employed by an FAA approved repair station while the
aircraft is in their care, custody or control for the purpose of maintenance, repair or test flight.278

272.

Id. at 1162.

273. Id. at 1162-63.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

No. C07-5398, 2008 WL 859929 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2008).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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The insured argued that coverage was not excluded because the failure
to include the word or or the word and in exclusion 1(c) rendered it
ambiguous, and that it should be construed in favor of the insured.279
The court rejected this argument, explaining that it must examine "'the
exclusion in question, the public policy considerations involved and the
transaction as a whole. ' "' Notwithstanding the absence of the word
or, the correct interpretation of the exclusion was that it applied to any
one of the conditions."' Because the pilot clearly did not meet the
requirements of the pilot endorsement, no coverage applied. 2
In Abdel v. North American Specialty Insurance Co.,283 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied both
parties' summary judgment motions regarding hull and liability coverage
because there was a genuine issue of material fact.' The issue of fact
dealt with statements made by the insurer's representative to the
insured student pilot about the qualifications of the flight instructor
required to provide the student instructions in the insured aircraft.2"
Previously, the instructor pilot was referred to in a quote and in the
application as a "Certified Flight Instructor" (CFI), meeting the "Open
Pilot Warranty."" The court explained that the terms defined in the
policy would ultimately control in the event of conflict with prior
representations, 7 but the term open pilot warranty was not defined
in the policy or elsewhere; instead, the quote, application, and policy also
referred to requirements for "additional pilots" to be approved to operate
the aircraft.'
Because both terms were used in the same documents,
as a matter of law, the court could not conclude that the term open pilot
warranty was the equivalent of the term additionalpilots.2 89
The instructor operating the aircraft during the accident did not meet
the additional pilot requirements because he was not twenty-five years
old, had not logged one thousand hours of pilot-in-command time, and
had not flown the accident aircraft before. 2" Although the instructor

279.
280.
1997)).
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-4 (quoting Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 939 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Ariz.
Id. at *4.
Id.
No. 3:06-1192, 2008 WL 249681 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2008).
Id. at *7-8.
Id.
Id. at *3.
See id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.at *6-7.
Id. at *6.
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had occasionally flown a similar aircraft, 2 91 this was not sufficient to
meet the required twenty-five hours in the same make and model as the
accident aircraft.292 In affidavit testimony, the insured student pilot
claimed that when he asked the insurance representative about the
qualifications of the CFI, the representative told him that most flight
instructors would meet the "Open Pilot Warranty."293 The representative also allegedly told the insured that he should not name a specific
flight instructor as an approved pilot because it would be necessary to
do more paperwork if he changed instructors. 2 Summary judgment
was not appropriate because what the insurance representative said or
did not say presented factual questions that could only be resolved by a
credibility determination.295
Likewise, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment because there was a question of fact about whether the flight
was a training flight on which the instructor was acting as the student's
CFI.2
On the one hand, the student testified that he had done
preflight planning and preparation; on the other hand, he was in the
back seat asleep during the accident.297
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